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Abstract 
Although still in its early phases, the Juncker Commission has already broken new ground. 
Not only is Jean-Claude Juncker the first Commission President to be selected by the 
Spitzenkandidaten process, an extra-constitutional system that has reconfigured the European 
Union’s institutional balance, but he has transformed the structure and operation of the 
College in order to create a more political, and therefore more effective, Commission, and 
made good – so far – on his promise ‘to do better on the bigger things and be small on the 
small things’. This article examines this three-fold transformation. It looks at the innovations 
and change associated with the Juncker Commission. It considers what motivated them and 
how they were achieved, sets them in historical perspective, and discusses their implications 
for the institutions and for the EU more broadly. 
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Although still at an early stage of its five-year term, the Juncker Commission is already one of 
the most noteworthy in the history of the European Union (EU). Its President, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, is the first to be nominated to the office as a result of the Spitzenkandidaten process, 
a system intended to mobilise interest in elections to the European Parliament and to enhance 
the EU’s legitimacy by linking the election results to the appointment of the European 
Commission. The new Commission President, moreover, has instituted a radical overhaul of 
the Commission’s architecture. He has restructured the College, redefined its working 
methods and internal operation, and sought to create a political Commission that is capable of 
meeting the severe challenges that confront the EU. Furthermore, although other Commission 
Presidents have vowed to do ‘less, better’, few have been able to deliver. Building on the 
expansion of the Commission Presidency by José Manuel Barroso, and learning from his 
predecessor’s experience over two terms, Juncker appears well positioned to fulfil his election 
promise: to be ‘bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on 
small things’. 
It is also important to note the significance of the Juncker Presidency for conceptual 
arguments about EU leaders and EU leadership (see Helms, in this issue). First, in his conduct 
and interpretation of what the Spitzenkandidaten process implies, Juncker is the first 
Commission President to be able to claim a personal, electoral mandate. Although he was not 
directly elected by the citizenry and it would be difficult to contend that Juncker as 
Commission President has the same democratic credentials as a national political leader, the 
legitimacy that Juncker derives from his method of election makes him a unique figure in 
transnational governance. Second, the sometimes dramatic changes that Juncker has enacted 
in his early period in office demonstrate a high level of individual initiative and autonomy. 
The agency that Juncker has shown runs somewhat counter to the emphasis a number of 
authors have placed on the structural constraints confronting EU leaders (Hayward, 2008), 
and specifically the Commission President (Cramme, 2011: 43-44; Majone, 2014: 247-253), 
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suggesting that the leadership capacity of the office may have been underestimated).  
Focusing on the changes that he has introduced, this paper offers an early evaluation of 
the Juncker Commission. It examines the Commission President’s path to office, looks at the 
composition, structure and operation of the College, and considers the Commission’s policy 
programme. It compares Juncker’s approach to the Presidency to his predecessors and reflects 
on the historical significance of the Juncker Presidency for the development of the 
presidential office. It also considers the impact and implications of the innovations that 
characterise the Juncker Commission. In the spirit of Reinalda and Verbeek (2014: 603-604), 
cited by Helms (this issue), it takes an actor-, rather than an institution-, centred approach to 
leadership. 
  
CAREER, NOMINATION AND ELECTION 
Like his three immediate predecessors – Jacques Santer, Romano Prodi and José Manuel 
Barroso – Jean-Claude Juncker is a former Prime Minister.1 In common with three of the four 
– Prodi is the exception – he is a Christian Democratic and member of the European People’s 
Party (EPP). Other aspects of his background and experience, however, make him somewhat 
unusual even among this company. The longest-serving prime minister in the EU, Juncker 
succeeded Jacques Santer to the premiership of the Grand Duchy in 1995 when the latter was 
nominated to succeed Jacques Delors as Commission President. He remained in office, 
presiding over coalitions of various compositions until 2013, when he announced the 
resignation of his government.2 
In addition to his longevity as prime minister, Juncker has broader ministerial experience 
than most of his predecessors,3 as well as a longer history of close involvement in the EU; 
hence, the Financial Times’s description of him a ‘long-time EU eminence grise’ (Spiegel, 
2014). When he assumed the premiership, Juncker retained his responsibilities as minister for 
work and employment, and finance minister. As a result, he has been closely involved in the 
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single currency since its inception and has made significant interventions in other areas of EU 
policy since the late 1990s. As finance minister at the time of the Maastricht 
intergovernmental conference negotiations (IGCs), Juncker was one of the architects of 
economic and monetary union. In 2005 he became the first president of the Eurogroup of 
Eurozone finance ministers and continued in that role until 2014.4 In that capacity, he played a 
key role in negotiating the bailouts following the financial and economic crisis. As minister 
for work and employment, he was one of the draughtsman of the European Employment 
Strategy or ‘Luxembourg process’.  
 
THE SPITZENKANDIATEN ‘REVOLUTION’5 
In institutional terms, it is Juncker’s route from candidate to appointment as Commission 
President that distinguishes him most sharply from his predecessors.6 All other Commission 
Presidents were appointed by common accord of heads of state of government, subject (since 
the Treaty of the European Union) to approval by the European Parliament. Juncker was one 
of five ‘lead candidates’ - Spitzenkanditaten – each selected by their party to play a key part in 
the elections to the European Parliament and to be its nominee for Commission President. As 
a result, Juncker’s appointment was more protracted, more public, and more political than that 
of previous presidents. It also distinguishes him and his office sharply from other 
transnational leaders. 
The Spitzenkandidaten system is an extra-constitutional process championed by advocates 
of a more direct linkage between European elections and the appointment of the Commission 
in the interests of enhancing the EU’s legitimacy. It was advanced following the introduction 
of the Lisbon Treaty, and is the latest episode in which the European Parliament has taken 
advantage of formal rules to extend its own influence by establishing a political convention 
that it is difficult for other institutions to constrain or reverse. The emergence of the 
Spitzenkandidaten system is best understood in the context of efforts on the part of the EU’s 
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political leaders since Maastricht to respond to perceptions of a democratic deficit by 
strengthening the European Parliament. 
The process began when the Treaty of European Union made consultation by member 
governments of the European Parliament compulsory before they proceeded to the nomination 
of the person they intended to appoint as Commission President. The College was then 
‘subject as a body to a vote of approval by the European Parliament’ (Article 158(2)). 
Although the procedures for approving the College were amended by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice,7 the nomination process remained unchanged until the 
Lisbon Treaty. The latter introduced three changes: the European Council would propose a 
candidate ‘taking into account the elections to the European Parliament’; the European 
Council will act by qualified majority; and the candidate ‘shall be elected by the European 
Parliament by a majority of its component members.’8  
Although the Lisbon Treaty extended the power of the European Parliament, it did not 
create the connection between the results of the European elections and the appointment of 
the European Commission that proponents of greater EU parliamentarianization had 
proposed. Primary among them, the European People’s Party (EPP) had called for a direct 
linkage since the Laeken Declaration launched the ‘Future of Europe’ debate in 2001 (EPP 
2014). In October 2002, on the eve of the Constitutional Convention at its Estoril Congress, 
which was attended by ten EPP prime ministers, including José Manuel Barroso the then 
prime minister of Portugal,9 the EPP proposed in its ‘Constitution for a Strong Europe’ that: 
‘A candidate for the President of the European Commission should be proposed to the 
European Parliament by the European Council in light of the outcome of European elections, 
and by qualified majority vote’ (emphasis added).’ The Convention Praesidium adopted a 
looser wording, however, requiring only that the European Council should take the results of 
the European elections into account. This was the formulation that would reappear in the draft 
Constitutional Treaty and, ultimately, in the Lisbon Treaty. 
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 The EPP continued to support its more radical alternative and argued that European 
parties should choose a candidate for the Commission Presidency, who would lead its 
campaign in the European elections. In both 2004 and 2009, the EPP declared Barroso its 
candidate, then in November 2012 EPP President, Wilfred Martens, announced that the party 
would select a candidate for the 2014 elections. With the approach of 2014, Commission 
President Barroso and Vice-President Reding – both EPP members – made similar calls: the 
first in his State of the Union 2012 address (Barroso, 2012), the second in a Commission 
Recommendation (Commission, 2013). An accompanying communication to the latter 
explained that Spitzenkandidaten ‘would make concrete and visible the link between the 
individual vote of the EU citizens for a candidate for membership of the European Parliament 
and the candidate for President of the Commission supported by the party of the candidate 
MEP. This would help EU citizens to better understand which candidate for President of the 
Commission their vote will ultimately support. It would increase the legitimacy of the 
President of the Commission and more generally, the democratic legitimacy of the whole EU 
decision-making process’ (Commission, 2013). In November 2012 the European Parliament 
(2012) adopted a resolution arguing along similar lines. Calling on European political parties 
to nominate candidates for the Commission presidency ahead of the 2014 elections, a further 
resolution adopted on 4 July 2013 asserted that the candidate put forward by the party that 
wins the most seats in the EP ‘will be the first to be considered’ for the post of President of 
the European Commission. 
As the 2014 European electives approached, five European political parties agreed to 
select ‘lead candidates’.10 The Party of European Socialists was the first. It selected Martin 
Schulz, the President of the European Parliament, as their candidate. The Liberals (Guy 
Verhofstadt), European Greens (Ska Keller and José Bové) and the Party of the European Left 
(Alex Tsipras) followed suit. The EPP, with 12 prime ministers as well as Commission 
President Barroso and President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, in office was 
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the last to make its choice. Both Chancellor Merkel and Herman van Rompuy expressed thir 
reservations, however, on the grounds that it shifted power away from the European Council 
towards the European Parliament (Spiegel, 2014a).  
According to supporters of the Spitzenkanditaten concept, there was no question after the 
EPP emerged from the polls on 25 May as the leading party, with 212 seats of the 751 seats, 
that Juncker should become Commission President. This view was challenged by David 
Cameron, who had voiced his objections throughout. The British prime minister was opposed 
to Juncker, whom he saw as an arch-federalist, although he was also concerned about the 
European Council’s loss of appointment power. London claimed to have the support of 
Budapest and Stockholm, while Chancellor Merkel was known to harbour reservations. 
Following reports that she had come under pressure for ‘betraying the voters and democracy 
in favour of back-room deals’ (Wagstyl, 2014), Merkel eventually declared her support for 
Juncker. At its meeting on 27 June, the European Council nominated Juncker Commission 
President by 26 votes to 2, with Cameron and Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orban, voting 
against11 - the first time a Commission President had not been nominated by unanimity. 
Having been nominated by the European Council, Juncker needed a majority to be elected 
by the European Parliament. As he required 376 votes, Juncker was forced to look beyond the 
EPP for support. The programme, ‘A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, 
Fairness and Democratic Change’, that Juncker presented to the plenary on 15 July 2014 
(Juncker, 2014a), was designed to appeal to a broad constituency. In setting out not only the 
actions he thought the Commission should take, but the working methods necessary for their 
delivery, Juncker drew on and expanded the priorities on which he had based his campaign.12 
In the event, he more than surpassed the threshold, with 422 votes. 
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE SPITZENKANDIDATEN PROCESS 
Although too early for an exhaustive analysis, it is worth considering some of its effects and 
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implications of the Spitzenkanditaten procedure.13 First, there can be little doubt that the 
European Parliament won its contest with the European Council. Christiansen (2015) argues 
the European Parliament prevailed because it was generally united and because its President 
gave his relentless support to the process. The heads of state and government, by contrast, 
were divided and had no alternative candidate. Schimmelfennig (2014) suggests that it would 
have been difficult for the European Council to withstand the normative weight of the 
argument that the lead candidate has an electoral mandate. Even if member governments had 
decided to resist, the European Parliament could have threatened to block any alternative 
candidate proposed by the European Council. It is difficult to see how the Spitzenkanditaten 
process could be rolled back and, therefore, it appears that the development of this extra-
constitutional mechanism has enabled the European Parliament to secure appointment power 
over the Commission President.14  
The wider implications are significant. The Spitzenkanditaten system displaces the 
European Council, which as Laffan contends, ‘is the core of the Union’s political authority 
and centre of its legitimacy’ (European Parliamentary Research Service 2014). It also 
undermines the Commission’s claim to independence, on which Majone (1996, 1998) has 
argued the legitimacy of the institution rests. Even if Juncker has followed the tradition of 
composing the College as a ‘super coalition’ (see below), his successors may not, with the 
danger that the institution that has historically claimed to embody the European interest may 
become identified with a particular party group.  Juncker’s emphasis on the mandate he has 
secured from the European Parliament will certainly make it difficult for the Commission to 
maintain an equidistant position between the Parliament and the European Council. 
At the same time, although few would claim that the Spitzenkandidaten process ignited 
popular interest in the European elections15 - indeed, turnout in 2014 at 42.61 per cent was 
marginally lower than the 2009 figure of 42.97 per cent – it was a more political process than 
the traditional method and did instigate a wider debate. To that extent, as Christiansen 
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contends, it has the potential for developing the European public sphere (European 
Parliamentary Research Service, 2014). Certainly, candidates were forced to engage more 
broadly and intensively than ever before.  Juncker, for example, contested a party primary, in 
which he defeated the then Commissioner for the Internal Market, Michel Barnier. He 
constructed and campaigned on a platform of explicit objectives and participated in nine 
‘presidential’ debates with other candidates in the run-up to the elections.16 He also mobilised 
a cross-party majority in the European Parliament which required him to be responsive to the 
demands of parties (and voters) other than his own. It is difficult to deny that Juncker has a 
mandate for his ‘political Commission’ or that he has a claim to a strong measure of personal 
legitimacy. 
 
A RESTRUCTURED COLLEGE 
The method by which its President’s was chosen is only the first novelty of the Juncker 
Commission. In line with his vision of a ‘political Commission’, dynamic and effective, 
Juncker has enacted a radical restructuring of the College. Recruitment of seasoned politicians 
to the new tier of Vice Presidencies has been an important element. 
 
NEW HOLES FOR NEW PEGS 
The Commission President decides on the structure and operation of the College, and 
allocates portfolios, but depends on member governments to nominate candidates. Conscious 
of the need for a Commission to deliver, Juncker departed from tradition and looked to recruit 
seven Vice-Presidents. Whereas the title had been largely honorary in previous Commissions, 
under Juncker it comes with responsibility for policy coordination, symbolized by reservation 
of the right of the right to submit agenda items for discussion at meetings of the College to the 
Vice-Presidents. 
The new structure was designed to overcome weaknesses, old and new. A tier of senior 
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politicians in Vice-President posts would ensure the spread of political responsibility among a 
team of experienced individuals, used to political pressure, managing competing policy 
demands, and dealing with the media. A complaint of the Barroso Commission had been that 
Commissioners had tended to become invisible, particularly in its second term, and were 
rarely available to explain Commission policy. The delegation of particular policies to 
individual Vice-Presidents also made clear exactly who was responsible for their delivery. 
Most importantly, however, the new structure was intended to give the Commission the strong 
political leadership it had lacked for much of its history. Although the Commission’s centre 
had been significantly strengthened since the late 1990s, the process of presidentialization that 
took place under the two Barroso Commissions (Kassim, 2012, Kassim et al, 2013, Kassim et 
al 2015) did not necessarily strengthen the collective capacity of the College to ensure 
effective policy delivery. The creation of a tier of Vice-Presidents to head policy groupings 
represents a strategy of shared leadership and responsibility intended to ‘ensure a dynamic 
interaction of all Members of the College’ and that ‘[t]he directors-general, all highly 
competent, have to obey their Commissioners and not the other way round’ (Juncker, 2014c). 
A further aim of compelling Commissioners to work together was to strengthen political 
leadership and prevent ‘divide and rule’ strategies on the part of Director Generals, and 
thereby to overcome the Commission’s fragmentation along departmental lines. As Juncker 
explained: ‘[Commissioners] will work together in a spirit of collegiality and mutual 
dependence. I want to overcome silo-mentalities and introduce a new collaborative way of 
working in areas where Europe can really make a difference.’ 
This new model was radical, first, because it appeared to depart from the convention that 
all Commissioners are equal,17 even if Juncker denied that this was the case: ‘In the new 
Commission, there are no first or second-class Commissioners – there are team leaders and 
team players.’ Second, although groups of Commissioners were nothing new – Hallstein had 
used them in the first College, as in the more recent past had Prodi and Barroso – the idea of 
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flexible, fluid and overlapping teams was an innovation. Third, the new structure raised issues 
of command and accountability. Since Vice-Presidents would be responsible for coordinating 
policy, but would not have direct responsibility for managing individual services, the new 
system created more complex arrangements between individual Commissioners and the 
administration. Finally, the new structure represented a novel way of ensuring that all 
Commissioners would have meaningful functions. The expansion of the College as result of 
enlargement had led to a multiplication of portfolios, which created agenda inflation, further 
coordination problems, and minor or redundant responsibilities.  
 
FROM NOMINATION TO APPROVAL 
Juncker’s thinking about the structure of the Commission became apparent as he sought 
nominations for the College from the member states. The multiple and repeated leaking of 
organigrams, which showed roles for Vice-Presidents and the definition of portfolio 
responsibilities, sometimes with the names of potential designates pencilled in, appears to 
have been part of a gaming process over the summer, whereby the Commission President and 
his transition team sought to encourage national capitals to offer suitable candidates, to 
provoke them into re-thinking their nominations where the Commission President thought 
them not appropriate, or to incentivise the inclusion of more women with the promise that 
women would be appointed to senior portfolios.18 
The release of draft organograms was also a device to test ideas – whether the single 
market should continue as a portfolio, dividing economic responsibilities between two 
Commissioners, and whether energy and climate could be combined - as well to prepare the 
outside world for surprises.19 When the full team of Commissioners-designates was 
announced on 10 September (Juncker, 2014b), accompanied by a press release and memo 
outlining the proposed working methods of the College (Commission, 2014a, 2014b), some 
pairings still provoked a response. Either they appeared to involve a conflict of interest – for 
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example, Jonathan Hill, the UK nominee and Commissioner-designate for financial services, 
where the UK has a strong interest and had been concerned to protect the City of London and 
Miguel Arias Cañete, the Spanish Commissioner-designate for energy and climate change, 
despite his connections with the oil industry – or were simply considered inappropriate – for 
example, Tibor Navracsics, the Hungarian Commissioner-designate for education, culture and 
human rights, when he had been a member of a government that was held to have led an 
assault on civil rights. 
Indeed, these issues did emerge with others in the hearings.20 Hill was summoned to an 
unprecedented second hearing to allay concerns about his impartiality, while Pierre 
Moscovici’s candidacy was challenged over his ability to impose budgetary discipline on 
France when he had been part of a government in Paris that had run a deficit. Cañete was 
called to account not only on account of commercial interests in the oil industry, but for 
alleged comments made about a female rival. Questions were also levelled against the Czech 
Commissioner-designate for Justice, Věra Jourová, and, the former Slovenian prime minister, 
Alenka Bratušek, Juncker's proposed Vice-President for Energy Union, who as interim 
premier put her own name forward despite having lost the election. Navracsics also came 
under challenge. 
Following consultation and negotiations with party leaders in the European Parliament, 
which led to a number of concessions – a practice that has become an established part of the 
process21 - Juncker was able to push through Cañete, Hill, and Moscovici. However, when 
Bratušek withdraw her candidacy following her rejection by the European Parliament, 
Juncker was obliged to ask Ljubijana for a replacement. Juncker assigned Slovenia’s new 
Commissioner-designate, Violeta Bulc, to transport, and switched Maros Šefčovič – a 
returning Commissioner, who had already appeared before the EP transport committee - from 
the transport portfolio and nominated him Vice-President for energy union, the role originally 
envisaged for Bratušek. After the parliamentary committee had rejected Navracsics for the 
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Education, Culture, Youth and Citizenship portfolio, Juncker transferred the citizenship 
portfolio to Dimitris Avramopoulos, the Greek Commissioner-designate for home affairs, but 
allowed the Hungarian Commissioner-designate to retain Education, Culture and Youth. 
Although in response to concerns expressed by Members of the European Parliament (MEP) 
on the left he agreed to switch responsibility for pharmaceuticals (initially assigned to the 
commissioner-designate for industry, Elżbieta Bieńkowska) to the Commissioner-designate 
for Health, Vytenis Andriukaitis, and sustainable development from Cañete to Timmermans, 
Juncker insisted on maintaining the division between economic and social responsibilities that 
MEPs on the left had questioned. 
Juncker presented his team and political priorities before a plenary session of the 
European Parliament on 22 October. In his speech (Juncker, 2014c) he warned that his 
Commission represented the ‘last chance’ to win back the trust of European citizens and made 
clear that his Commission would be ‘more political’ than the current one. Addressing 
concerns on both political wings, Juncker once again underlined his commitment to 
transparency and to cutting back on excessive bureaucracy. Four-hundred-and-twenty-three 
MEPs voted in favour, with the largest three groups - the EPP, the Socialists and Democrats, 
and ALDE - broadly in support, with 209 votes against (mainly from the Greens, the 
European United Left, and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy groups), while 67 
MEPs, mainly from the conservative ECR group,22 abstained. On the following day, the 
European Council (2014) adopted the decision appointing the European Commission to serve 
from 1 November 2014 until 31 October 2019. 
 
THE JUNCKER COMMISSION 
The incoming Commission President was largely successful in his ambition to appoint 
experienced politicians.23 The new College included nine former prime ministers or deputy 
prime ministers, nineteen former ministers, three former foreign ministers, seven former 
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Commissioners, and eight former MEPs. Its members are drawn from four political parties: 14 
from the EPP, one from the ECR, 8 from the Socialists and Democrats, and 5 from ALDE.24 
There are seven Vice-Presidents. Alongside Federica Mogherini, who as the High 
Representative must under the Treaty be a Vice-President and who will head the policy group 
on, two Vice-Presidents have over-arching responsibilities: Kristalina Georgieva, 
Commissioner responsible for the Budget; and Frans Timmermans, who as First Vice-
President, for subsidiarity and better regulation – competences that resonate with the exercise 
that he conducted as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands in the wake of the Dutch ‘no’ in the 
referendum on the draft Constitutional Treaty. The other four Vice-Presidents head policy 
groups: Jyrki Kaitainen – jobs, growth and investment; Valdis Dombrovskis – a deeper and 
fairer EMU; Andrus Ansip – a digital single market; and MarošŠefčovič – energy union and 
climate change (see Table 1). 
 
>>> about here: Table 1. The Juncker Commission. Vice-Presidents and project 
teams. 
 
One respect in which Juncker was less successful, however, was in delivering a better gender 
balance. His Commission has the same number (nine) as his predecessor. Juncker was well 
aware of this failing, reporting to the European Parliament that: 
 
‘I had to fight to get the national governments to put forward nine female members. At 
the end of July . . . we had three women designated by their governments. I had to 
persuade quite a few governments to send a woman Commissioner, and I had to turn 
down quite a few male candidates: I won’t say who they were because I wouldn’t wish 
to embarrass the prime ministers whom I managed to persuade to put forward a 
woman. But in all honesty, nine women out of 28 Commissioners is still ridiculously 
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low.’ 
 
ORGANIZATION AND WORKING METHODS 
Juncker’s vision of how the new Commission should operate was explained to incoming 
members of the Commission and the administration. Bilateral meetings with Commissioners-
designate were followed by mission letters that set out the Commission’s ‘new way of 
working’ and the importance for it to make ‘a fresh start’.25 For each Commission, the letters 
set out portfolio-specific objectives, with a timetable. They emphasized the need for 
members of the Commission to abide by the highest professional and ethic standards, the 
commitment to transparency, and the importance of close working relations with the 
European Parliament and the member states. Working methods were also discussed at a 
preparatory seminar held for the College in Brussels on 11 and 12 September, formalised in a 
communication from the Commission President to members of the Commission in November 
2014, and explained in briefings to Directors General. 
Three other organizational changes are noteworthy. First, Commissioners in the same 
policy group have been assigned offices on the same floors in the Berlaymont building. The 
hope is that physical propinquity will encourage coordination. Second, the size of 
Commissioners’ private offices has been reduced. Commissioners are allowed six member of 
cabinet plus a communications officer, though the Vice-Presidents can have seven and the 
First Vice-President eight. Importantly, since they have not been assigned services, the work 
of the Vice-Presidents will be supported by the Secretariat General, which accordingly has 
been allocated 80 new members of staff. Third, communications – a weak spot of the 
Commission26 – has been overhauled in an effort to ensure greater coordination and 
effectiveness. The spokesperson service has been reduced to a staff of 15, so that 
Commissioners no longer have their own spokesperson, all spokespersons will be present at 
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the midday briefing, and each spokesperson is responsible for a particular policy area. It has 
a new head in Margaritis Schinas and is directly responsible to the Commission President. 
More broadly, there is a general expectation that Commissioners will appear frequently 
before the press, and that Commissioners will visit each of the member states to explain EU 
policy on the ground. 
 
Will it work? 
The reorganization of the Commission around Vice-Presidents represents an innovative and 
audacious attempt to address a long-standing organizational problem. It required quick 
learning on the part of Vice-Presidents, particularly those new to the Commission, effective 
support since they do not have the expertise of a Directorate General on which to rely,27 and 
goodwill among Commissioners within each policy group, particularly on the part of portfolio 
Commissioners. Unsurprisingly, since there are obvious fault lines,28 tensions between 
Commissioners have already been reported (see, e.g. Keating, 2015; Rinaldi, 2014). The test 
is not whether there are differences among Commissioners with intersecting responsibilities, 
but whether the policy groups can develop workable and effective policy initiatives that can 
be driven through by the services. 
 
POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE 
Although far too early to reach a judgment on the policy success or otherwise of the Juncker 
Commission, five observations can be made about its performance thus far. First, activity has 
been tightly focused on the delivery of Juncker’s ten strategic priorities (Juncker, 2014a). The 
Commission work programme for 2015 was structured accordingly (Commission, 2015a - see 
Table 2). Presented by Commission President Juncker and Vice-President Timmermans, the 
work programme was remarkable both for its parsimony – it envisaged only 23 initiatives – 
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and because, in a sharp departure from previous practice and in line with the better regulation 
agenda, it announced the withdrawal of 80 pending proposals.29 The scrapping of legislation 
was not without controversy. Although Timmermans stressed that the Commission had not 
included anything that could not be achieved in 2015, there was an angry response of the part 
of some MEPs, especially in relation to two measures aimed at limiting air pollution and rules 
on waste (Keating, 2014).  
 
>>> about here:  Table 2. Commission President Juncker’s Political Guidelines 
and the 2015 Work Programme 
 
In its first few months, the Commission has made a promising start to the implementation of 
the programme. Among the most important initiatives, the €315 billion infrastructure 
investment plan – a flagship of the growth and jobs element of the Commission President’s 
programme – was announced on 24 November (Commission, 2014c), and guidance on the 
Growth and Stability Pact in January 2015. The energy union was launched on 25 February 
2015 (Commission, 2015b), progress made in developing the Trade and Transatlantic 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the digital single market strategy unveiled on 6 May 
2015. Measures have also been adopted on fair taxation as part of the deeper and fairer 
internal market theme, the Commission has attempted to find agreement on a new migration 
policy with member states, and there has been action on cutting red tape and improving 
transparency 
Second, Juncker has lived up to his promise to defend the Commission.30 In contrast to 
the past when criticisms made by national capitals went unanswered, Juncker has addressed 
them. When the Italian prime minister opined that even the EU’s so-called founding fathers 
would ‘become Eurosceptic if faced with “the EU’s bureaucrats and bureaucracy”’, for 
example, Juncker responded by pointing out that the Commission was a political organization, 
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not ‘a gang of anonymous bureaucrats’ (Gotev, 2015). Then, when speaking about the UK, he 
observed that: ‘Britain is not in a situation to impose its exclusive agenda on other members 
of the EU. I don’t want Britain to leave the EU but I don’t want the EU to follow an exclusive 
British commandership (sic)’ (Gotev, 2015). 
Third, the Juncker Commission has made a pronounced effort to improve 
communications. The Commission President and other members of the Commission have 
been available to meet the press and to address the other institutions, particular the European 
Parliament. When the ‘Luxleaks’ scandal emerged, for example, Juncker surprised the 
European Parliament by appearing personally to defend himself.31 The Commission 
President’s informal and self-deprecating style make him accessible, enable him to win trust, 
and has allowed him to deal lightly with insinuations about his personal habits (Spiegel, 
2014b).  
Fourth, Juncker has shown considerable tact and diplomacy in sensitive areas of policy. 
Although he has made clear that there are limits to what he will concede to the UK, he has 
taken an emollient tone, repeating that he does not want the UK to leave the UK and that he is 
in favour of a ‘fair deal’ (Pop, 2015). His appointment of Timmermans as Vice-President for 
better regulation and nomination of Hill as Commissioner for financial services appear 
gestures of goodwill to London. Juncker has also avoided unnecessary battles. Although they 
had run up deficits, the Commission chose not to impose penalties on France or Italy, but 
instead accepted their promises to reform.  
Finally, in keeping with Juncker’s reputation as a fixer, there is evidence of effective 
coordination and relations management behind the scenes. Within the Commission, Juncker’s 
chef de cabinet, Martin Selmayr, has developed a formidable reputation. Between institutions, 
Juncker maintains close relations with Martin Schulz, who has been described as ‘a whip for 
the “grand coalition”’ that the Commission President needs to secure a majority in the 
European Parliament and Gianni Pitella, the head of Socialists and Democrats (Palmeri, 
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2015). He also has a good relationship with Donald Tusk, President of the European 
Council.32 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although it has not even reached the midpoint in its term, the Juncker Commission has 
already made an impact. For observers who expected that the ultimate EU insider would carry 
on business as usual, the changes he has wrought have been far-reaching. While the full 
significance of the Spitzenkandidaten process has yet to fully materialize, it appears at first 
sight to mark yet another victory for the European Parliament. Parliamentary hearings were 
already a landmark, but the rise of Spitzenkandidaten system give the European Parliament 
not only the negative power to reject Commissioners, but the ability to choose the 
Commission President. It constitutes a decisive and perhaps irrevocable shift in the EU’s 
institutional balance from a system centred on the European Council to a parliamentary 
model, with the accompanying ‘perils’ (Majone, 2002). Certainly, Juncker’s pronouncements 
seem to make clear that he considers the European Parliament to be the source of his 
legitimacy.33 
Meanwhile, Juncker’s overhaul of the Commission, its organization and working 
methods, has been radical. Though not quite as revolutionary as the method of his 
appointment, it is doubtful that such wide-ranging change could have been possible without 
the electoral mandate that Juncker is able to claim. In strengthening the collective leadership 
capacity of the College, Juncker has addressed long-standing problems in the Commission’s 
operation. There are many reasons why the experiment may not work, but Juncker has shown 
vision, courage and imagination in his gamble on a ‘political Commission’. 
Furthermore, Juncker has not only entered office with a mandate that none of his 
predecessors enjoyed, but despite his protestations to the contrary,34 has greater command 
over its operation than previous Commission Presidents. The power of the Commission 
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Presidency has been transformed from ‘scarcely a job at all’ (Campbell, 1983: 181) into a 
powerful leadership position. José Manuel Barroso was responsible for significantly 
strengthening the office. However, whereas his immediate predecessor was able to pick 
priorities and to exercise unprecedented power over policy (Kassim et al, 2015), Juncker 
drafted, campaigned and was elected on his own programme, appointed members of the 
College to deliver it, and restructured the Commission around it. 
Finally, the Juncker Presidency has a wider conceptual importance. The 
Spitzenkandidaten has changed more than the selection procedure. As well as tying the 
Commission Presidency more closely to the European Parliament, it grants a powerful 
personal mandate to the incoming incumbent, continuing the process by which the holder of 
the office has grown in pre-eminence that was initiated by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Kassim 
et al, 2015), and bestows a claim to legitimacy to the head of an international administration 
that is unique in transnational governance. Moreover, contrary to the assertions from a more 
structuralist perspective, the experience of the Juncker Presidency, like the Barroso 
Presidency before it, shows that there remains scope for agency, even within a dense and 
complex institutional space, and when the climate for EU action has become increasingly 
hostile. 
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Notes 
																																								 																				
1  Since the creation of the EU, prime ministerial experience has become a de facto requirement for 
appointment to the Commission Presidency. 
2  His resignation from the premiership followed a scandal concerning the intelligence services 
3  Barroso was prime minister of Portugal between 2002 and 2004, and leader of the opposition, 
1999-2002. He was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the early 1990s, state secretary for foreign 
affairs 1987-92, and state secretary for home affairs 1985-87. Prodi was prime minister of Italy 
between 1996 and 1998. Santer was prime minister of Luxembourg from 1984 to 1995. He had 
been finance minister from 1979 to 1989. 
4  He had also held senior positions at the World Bank, the IMF and the EBRD.  
5  See Barber (2014). 
6  On the rise of the Spitzenkandidaten concept, see EPP (2014), EuroParl TV (2015). 
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7  The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a separate vote of approval for the member states’ nominee 
(new Article 214(2) EC). The Treaty of Nice changed the decision rule in the Council for the 
approval of all Commissioners from common accord to qualified majority voting. 
8  The relevant provision – Article 17(7) TEU – reads as follows: ‘Taking into account the elections 
to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for 
President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a 
majority of its component members. If he does not obtain the required majority, the European 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall 
be elected by the European Parliament following the same procedure.’ 
9  See EPP (2014). 
10  The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) chose not to select a lead candidate. 
11  Britain had blocked the nomination of Jean-Luc Dehaene in 1994 and Guy Verhofstadt in 2004. 
12  For Juncker’s priorities, see http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities 
13  See, e.g., Schimmelfennig (2014), Kocharov (2014), Grant (2014) 
14  See Kocharov (2014). For earlier examples of competence maximizing on the part of the 
European Parliament, see Hix (2002). On how the European Parliament’s rise and rise differs 
from national parliaments, see Schimmelfennig (2014). 
15  Grant (2014) argues, for example, that it does not offer a genuine choice. 
16  Only one debate involved all five, but three involved four and Juncker participated in nine, 
including with Schultz. 
17  Barroso, for example, had insisted in the wake of the ‘big bang’ enlargement that Commissioners 
from new and old member states would be equal. 
18  The President-elect’s transition team was headed by Martin Selmayr, previously head of Vice-
President Reding’s cabinet and campaign manager for Juncker’s presidency bid, and included 
Clara Martínez Alberola, who has served in President Barroso’s cabinet, Natasha Bertaud, who 
was press officer to Juncker during his campaign, and Luc Tholoniat, previously assistant to 
Secretary General, Catherine Day. 
19  A guiding principle, in the words of one interviewee, was ‘you need a thief a catch a thief’. 
20  The Hearing procedure is governed by Rule 118 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure. 
21  Barroso, for example, had been blocked from appointing Rocco Buttiglione in 2004 and Rumiana 
Jeleva, in 2009. 
22  The conservative ECR group welcomed the new Commission structure, despite abstaining from 
the vote. Indeed, Syed Kamall, President of the ECR group, praised Juncker for his plans for ‘an 
integrated structure focused on outcomes’. 
23  See details at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019_en, checked 4 November 2015 
24  As Bertonchini (2014) observes, in spite of the EPP’s weaker electoral performance compared 
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with 2009 the partisan balance between the Barroso and the Juncker Commission is relatively 
unchanged. Juncker has 19 members from the centre and centre-right, and nine from the left and 
centre-left, while Barroso had 21 and 7 respectively. The main differences are the smaller number 
of ALDE-affiliated members (5 rather than 8) and the inclusion of an ECR-affiliated member.  
25  The letters are available on the Commission’s website at 
  http://ec.europa.eu/archives/juncker-commission/mission/index_en.htm, checked 4 November 
2015. 
26  An online survey conducted among Commission staff as part of a project led by the current author 
found that only 12 per cent of respondents believed that the College communicated effectively 
with the services and only 9 per cent that the Commission communicated effectively with 
European citizens (Connolly and Kassim, 2015). 
27  The cabinets have an important role to play, but they are not only smaller, but also more junior 
and therefore less experienced than historically as a result of reforms introduced since the early 
1990s to limit parachutage. 
28  For example, within the energy union group between pollution and energy systems, and within the 
maritime and environmental protection portfolio. 
29  Between 2009 and 2014, the Barroso Commission proposed an average of 130 new initiatives in 
each annual work programme, and proposed to withdraw an average of 30. 
30  Juncker made clear that he was fearless in this respect: ‘I don’t want to hide from you that I have 
the firm intention to respond to all unjustified criticism addressed to the Commission, no matter 
from where they come. I am not a guy who trembles before the Prime Ministers or before other 
high instances.’. 
31  In a scandal that became known as ‘Luxleaks’ it emerged that Luxembourg had allowed more 
than a thousand companies to avoid paying tax. As prime minister of the Grand Duchy from 1995 
to 2013, Juncker was embarrassed by the scandal, although he claimed on 12 November 2014 
never to have given instructions on any particular dossier. With 77 signatories the Five Star 
movement, UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the National Front moved a vote of censure 
against the Commission in the European Parliament. It was defeated with 466 votes against. 
32  It is noteworthy that Juncker was charged with preparing the second report on the evolution of 
economic and monetary union – the so-called ‘Five President’s Report’ (Juncker et al 2015), 
when Tusk’s successor, Herman van Rompuy, had taken the lead in writing the first report (the 
‘Four Presidents’ report’) in 2012. 
33  Juncker (2014c) declared in his address to the plenary on 22 October 2014: ‘I have been elected 
President of the Commission on the basis of a programme that binds me to the European 
Parliament. I have a contract with you, Mr President, and with this House, and I intend to abide by 
the terms of the contract I put before you this summer.’ 
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34  In his speech on 22 October 2014, Juncker called himself ‘the big loser’, because ‘I have 
delegated most of my jobs and prerogatives to the Vice-Presidents’. He added: ‘I am too old to 
launch a new career as a dictator’. 
 
 
 
Key Quotes – Note to author: Please select 3-5 key quotes from the text. 
 
‘…Juncker appears well positioned to fulfil his election promise: to be ‘bigger and more 
ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things’. P.2. 
 
‘…Juncker’s appointment was more protracted, more public, and more political than that of 
previous presidents’. P.4 
 
‘…Juncker departed from tradition and looked to recruit seven Vice-Presidents. Whereas the 
title had been largely honorary in previous Commissions, under Juncker it comes with 
responsibility for policy coordination, symbolized by reservation of the right of the right 
to submit agenda items for discussion at meetings of the College to the Vice-Presidents.’. 
(p.9) 
 
‘The test is not whether there are differences among Commissioners with intersecting 
responsibilities, but whether the policy groups can develop workable and effective policy 
initiatives that can be driven through by the services’. (p.16) 
 
‘While the full significance of the Spitzenkandidaten process has yet to fully materialize, it 
appears at first sight to mark yet another victory for the European Parliament’. (p.18) 
